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T HE idea of witchcraft, as you will know, is not confined to any 
one set of peoples, but is distributed through many different 
races, cultures, and environments. It occurs among primitive 
peoples from Africa to the South Seas and from Asia to America. 
Its record among civilised peoples is only a little shorter. Every­
one knows that Joan of Arc was a convicted witch. However, it 
is not always recalled that witches were still being burnt in 
Europe down to the age of the French Revolution. The last occa­
sion was in 1782 in Switzerland.
My object to-night is to discuss witchcraft beliefs and witch 
persecutions as they appear from the standpoint of modern 
anthropology. Our science has learnt a great deal about witches 
since the pioneering days of Sir James Frazer and Edward Tylor. 
Besides collecting much more exact knowledge we have gained a 
far deeper insight into the social meaning of witchcraft.
It is pleasant to be able to say that some of the most notable 
advances in knowledge and understanding are owed to former 
holders of this Chair of Anthropology at Rhodes: to Professor 
and Mrs. Krige who studied witchcraft in the Transvaal among 
the Lovedu(1) 2, and to Professor Wilson who, with her husband, 
studied it in Tanganyika among the Nyakyusa(12). My third and last 
predecessor, Professor Radcliffe-Brown, has been prudent enough 
to work only among tribes where there are no witches. But to 
him is due the great general illumination of principles and 
methods without which modern Social Anthropology could not 
have progressed as it has. I feel that it is a special privilege and 
honour to have him here to-night.
I
(1) J .  D . a n d  E. J .  K rig e , T he R ea lm  o f a  R a in  Queen.
(2) M . H u n te r , R eaction  to  C onquest, C h. 6 ; M. W ilson , G ood C om pany, Ch. 5 a n d  
p. 198 ff. ; “ W itc h  B e lie fs  a n d  S o c ia l S t r u c tu r e ” ; A m erican  Jou rn al o f S ociology, 
v. 56, J a n u a r y  1951, p. 307 ; K eiskam m ah oek  R ural S urvey, ▼. 3 : S o c ia l S tru c tu r e ,
C h. 6.
In what I say to-night, I shall be drawing together some of the 
important points about witchcraft that have been made by various 
anthropologists studying particular tribes; and I shall also be 
outlining some general conclusions which have been suggested to 
me both by the literature and by my own fieldwork.
When one starts to think about witchcraft, commonsense sug­
gests the first question how it is that ideas so absurd, fantastic 
and often horrible have been so widely distributed in place and 
time. At the same time, since witchcraft ideas are widespread 
without being universal, one wants to account for their absence 
too. Some of the most primitive peoples on earth, including 
Australian aboriginals and Bushmen here in South Africa, do not 
believe in witches.
One thing is clear: the witchcraft idea must be related to 
something real in human experience. Occurring at so many 
different times and places and cultural levels it cannot be lightly 
dismissed as a frill on the edge of human fantasy. Social Anthro­
pology. then, is concerned with finding out what is the basic 
reality underlying witchcraft ideas. When I say reality I do not 
mean physical fact. Even the most optimistic fieldworker does 
not expect to see anyone flying on those well-known broomsticks. 
The kind of reality we are searching for is social and psycho­
logical The witchcraft belief, and the persecution of witches, are 
a response to social and psychological strains. The more exactly 
we can identify those strains, the better we can hope to under­
stand the response.
I shall first have to say what witches are. This is not a simple 
matter. Until Evans-Pritchard’s classic work on the Azande there 
was little serious effort to distinguish witchcraft from sorcery or 
to isolate it from black magic generally. But as we have to choose 
a working concept, I would suggest that the essence of the witch­
craft idea is simply this : People believe that the blame for some 
of their sufferings rests upon a peculiar evil power, embodied in 
certain individuals in their midst; although no material connection 
can be empirically demonstrated between those individuals and 
the ills they are supposed to have caused.
The witch then is held to be a person in whom dwells a dis­
tinctive evilness, whereby he harms his own fellows in myster­
iously secret ways. To this central mystical idea each society adds 
its own embellishments.
One of the fascinations of these mystical embellishments is the 
recurrence of identical details in astonishingly different surround­
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ings. Shakespeare writing in 17th century England about mediae­
val Scottish witches makes them recite a list of creatures that 
would be just as appropriate to witches in primitive Africa. Or 
again : the Pueblo Indians in Mexico say that witches go round 
at night carrying lights that alternately flare up and die down'1'; 
exactly the same thing was said to me in Western Kenya by the 
Bantu tribe among whom I worked.
One could quote many of these minute parallels. It is not my 
task to-night to deal with them as such nor to interpret their 
symbolism. But perhaps it may help us to discern order in the 
symbolism if we list the major elements that seem to be common 
to witchcraft myths nearly everywhere :
First, the myth defines a category of persons who may be 
witches, and states how they can be recognised by particular signs. 
Witches are practically always adults, very often women, and apt 
to spring from witch families. They may bear physical stigmata— 
either external, like a red eye or a Devil’s mark, or internal, like 
a snake in the belly or a special witchcraft substance. Personally 
they are often reserved, stingy, and quarrelsome.
Secondly, the myth tells what sorts of misfortune can be caused 
by witches. Often these include natural calamities such as death, 
sickness, drought or plague. However, the context of the misfor­
tune is usually more significant than its intrinsic nature. Witches 
typically send particular and unaccountable blows that seem 
somehow out of the common run.
Thirdly, the myth states that witches turn against their own 
neighbours and kinsmen; they do not harm strangers or people 
from far away.
' Fourthly, they work from envy, malice or spite, against indi­
viduals, rather than in pursuit of material gain as such. Sometimes 
they are “just greedy,” or they may have no conscious motive 
at all.
Fifthly, witches always work in secret, and especially at night.
Sixthly, witches are not entirely human. Their evil power is 
something sui generis, quite unlike ordinary ways of dealing 
injury such as force or poison. It may work upon its victims 
immediately, that is to say without the use of any instrument at 
all. The witch only has to wish you harm, and the harm is as good 
as done. A witch then is a human being who incorporates a non­
human power. When a myth refers to snakes or other objects in
(1) E. C. P arson s, M itla , Tow n o f th e S ouls, p. 131.
the belly of the witch, it seems to be reflecting this notion. Other 
myths reflect it by saying that witches are possessed by spirits or 
devils, or that at night they forsake human form and turn into 
were-creatures.
Seventhly, witches reverse all normal standards. They particu­
larly delight in “unnatural” practices such as incest or bestiality; 
they eat their own children, they dig up corpses. They go naked 
instead of clothed; they excrete in the middle of the dwelling. 
Even when they knock on your door they stand backwards; or 
when they ride on baboons, as the Pondo witches do, they face 
towards the tail. In Christian countries witches repeat prayers 
or the whole Mass in reverse order.
Lastly, witchcraft is always immoral. At best it is disapproved; 
at worst it inspires horror like other so-called unnatural practices. 
Witchcraft properly so-called cannot be justified111.
So much for the myth of witchcraft. But though Social Anthro­
pology is concerned with myths and beliefs, it is even more directly 
concerned with actions, with what men actually do and not how 
they live. Malinowski made popular the saying that a myth 
provides charter for action. We have to study the witchcraft 
system as a whole, the actions as well as the myths, the entire 
complex of beliefs, attitudes, and activities. And having done this 
we should try to relate it to other social systems, and to find out 
what part it plays in the working of society as a whole.
Whether anyone ever tries to be a witch and actually perform 
witchcraft is a question that has to be separately determined in 
each society we study. In some primitive tribes the answer seems 
to be yes. More often there is no positive evidence, but even so 
things sometimes happen in the field that shake one’s scepticism. 
Like Evans-Pritchard among the Azande121, I have seen among 
the Gusii at night suggestive lights moving near my camp, lights 
that died down and flared up again exactly as the witchcraft myth 
alleges. Gusii say that witches produce this effect by raising and 
lowering the lids of covered fire-pots which they carry with them.
However, Social Anthropology only claims to analyse be­
haviour that has been properly observed, and observed with some 12
(1) E x c e p tio n  m a y  be ta k e n  to  s ta t in g  th i s  a s  a  g e n e ra l ru le  in  th e  l ig h t  o f in s ta n c e s  
su c h  a s  th e  H e ib a n  a n d  T ira ,  c i te d  by N ad e l, T h e  N ub a , p. 157 a n d  202. P e rso n a lly , 
I  w ould  p r e f e r  to  defin e  w i tc h c r a f t  a s  so m e th in g  e s s e n tia lly  im m o ra l. See a lso  M. 
W ilson , G ood C om pany, p . 97, n o te  2, a b o u t  h e r  s u b s t i tu t io n  o f th e  te rm  " d e fe n d e r” 
fo r  “ d e fe n d e r  w itc h e s .”
(2) W itch cra ft, O racles and M agic am on g  th e A zande. C la re n d o n  P re ss , 1937.
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regularity. This condition which does not as yet apply to witch­
craft practices, does of course apply to the counter-action that 
people take against witches. Even if some individuals do try to 
be witches, the witchcraft power itself is surely imaginary, but 
the power of the idea regularly inspires people to defence or 
counter-attack. This therefore is the kind of action that field- 
workers have observed and analysed. We can analyse it irrespec­
tive of whether its referent is real or unreal, much as we could 
analyse a church service while leaving the existence of God an 
open question.
Let us start by distinguishing two broad categories of action 
against witches. These categories correspond to the two elements 
in the nature of the witch, who is non-human and yet human. 
Insofar as the witchcraft power is non-human, one may try to 
nullify it by antidotes as mystical as itself. One may recite spells 
or wear amulets or put down medicines. This is a kind of duelling 
in the realm of fantasy, a duel between two equally imaginary 
forces. Judged by rational standards it cannot produce any con­
crete effects, as distinct from psychological ones. But because the 
wielder of witch-power is also a human being, one may also try 
to evade or control him as a human being. This is another kind 
of duelling, not mere fantasy but working social effects that are 
plain for all to see. For example, among the Gusii it is quite 
common for whole families to leave their homes through fear of 
witches; or the self-styled victims might seek reconciliation or 
pick quarrels, or start whispering campaigns, or complain to the 
elders. Or they might call in a “smeller” which is the name they 
give to professional witch-detectives; in former days a witch who 
had been duly smelt out might be put to death, but nowadays the 
use of criminal sanctions against witches is not allowed by the 
Kenya Administration.
When we consider all the activity that is directed against 
supposed witches, the question must be asked when or why people 
start going to all this trouble: what events or situations give them 
the impulse to start fighting this imaginary menace. It is clear 
that the stimulus is a feeling of unease or anxiety; but this state­
ment needs to be analysed further. After all, many events and 
many situations regularly create anxiety, but not all of them 
bring the witchcraft idea into operation. Death and sickness, for 
instance, always create anxiety, but the emotion can often be 
dealt with by the ordinary routine responses. The routine response 
to a death is a funeral, the routine response to a sickness is 
medical treatment. The idea of witchcraft is invoked on occasions 
when these routine responses alone do not give emotional satis­
faction.
Events are creating a special anxiety when they are termed 
unnatural, or uncanny. They are seeming to run counter to the 
ordinary course of things. The anxiety fastens on to the question 
of what deeper causation can have underlain the observed event. 
Among ourselves, we know that some deaths arouse a special 
anxiety so that we feel impelled to investigate their deeper causa­
tion. It is not enough to bury the man who got drowned in the 
river. We may also insist on finding out why he got drowned,— 
whether he jumped in, whether someone pushed him in, or 
whether it was just an accident.
The witchcraft idea is commonly invoked as a concept for 
explaining the deeper or indirect causation of events which seem 
unnatural. Evans-Pritchard has brilliantly analysed Azande 
witchcraft beliefs in this light. Of course, the sphere of the 
“unnatural” is defined differently in every culture. The Azande 
explain very many deaths by witchcraft: they think it is unnatural 
to die unless one is very old. Other peoples explain things differ­
ently.
Within a given culture, we have also to reckon with the indi­
vidual point of view. Subjective factors may largely influence 
the tendency to suspect witchcraft in particular cases. You may 
think that you have an unnatural illness: I may see nothing odd 
about it. And the observed facts can nearly always be given a 
different twist by a person with a different point of view. This 
was nicely illustrated for me by an old Gusii man. “Suppose there 
is a cattle plague,” he said. “Nearly all of my cattle die, but my 
neighbour loses only a couple of beasts. I wonder whether he has 
bewitched me; it was strange that I should lose so many, and he 
only so few. Now that neighbour has seen that I am still able to 
lead out my plough with a pair of strong oxen, but the plague 
has killed just those two animals of his that he always used for 
ploughing. He says to himself how strange it is that I can still 
plough and not he. Perhaps I am the one who has bewitched him. ’
Even if only for reasons like these, the anthropologist would 
hardly expect to be able to predict by rule of thumb just what 
events will lead to the suspicion of witchcraft and what will not. 
But there is another limitation too. Witchcraft is usually not the only mystic agency that can be suspected of sending peculiar or 
unnatural misfortunes. Many a primitive universe is peopled 
with numbers of mystic agencies whose hand may be suspected 
behind any unusual event. Among the Gusii, for instance, strokes 
of bad luck may be interpreted as the work of witches, but they 
may also be attributed to sorcerers, or to the evil eye, or to 
ancestor spirits, or to broken taboos, or to perjured oaths, or to
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ritual uncleanliness or perhaps just to luck, “the luck of God,” 
as they say. A different kind of remedy or protection will be used 
according to which of these agencies is held responsible.
II
If we want to understand the functions of the witchcraft 
system as a response to human sufferings and anxieties, I think 
we have to consider how it fits into a people’s entire cosmology, 
or view of the universe, or philosophy of life. I am especially 
thinking of what we ourselves call the problem of evil. For 
example, among those mystic agencies which I have just enumer­
ated. the Gusii regard some as fundamentally just or good and 
others as fundamentally unjust or evil Ancestor spirits belong 
to the first category: they are like angry fathers—always right; 
they do not trouble people except those who deserve to be 
troubled. When a Gusii thinks that his bad luck was sent by 
ancestor spirits, he is construing it as a moral sanction called 
down by some misconduct of his own. Witches belong to the 
second category; they are always wrong. When a Gusii thinks 
that his bad luck was sent by witches he is construing it as un­
provoked aggression against himself. The former is a response in 
terms of guilt and atonement, the latter in terms of resentment 
and counter-attack.
Take by way of contrast the cosmology of the Andaman 
Islanders. They too have a cult of ancestral spirits, but unlike the 
Gusii they find it no blasphemy to accuse the spirits of doing 
wrong. As Radcliffe-Brown has shown us, when a death occurs 
among these people the anger is directed against the spirits and 
may find expression in violent railing against them(1). This con­
trast must obviously be relevant to the fact that the Andamanese 
do not believe in witches and the Gusii do.
Again, among the Tallensi, as Fortes has shown, the ancestor 
and earth cults can on the whole deal adequately with most social 
or psychological tensions. The idea of witchcraft, though it does 
exist, does not rank as equal to these in the cosmology: it appears 
mainly as a mixture of superstition and folklore(2).
The Gusii witchcraft belief helps to maintain their picture of 
the moral universe. By blaming witches they escape the need or 
temptation to blame spirits. The spirits can remain good because 
the witches are bad. (Incidentally, the Gusii have no answer to 
the question why these good and just spirits fail to protect virtuous 
men against evil witches. That problem is more directly tackled.
(1) T h e  A n d a m a n  I s la n d e rs .  F re e  P re s s , p . 300
(2) M. F o r te s , T h e  W eb o f K in s h ip  am o n g  th e  T a lle n s i , p . 33 ff.
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among others, by the Venda in the Northern Transvaal, who say 
that before a witch can harm anyone the protective ancestor 
spirits must be caught off guard'1’).
There are some cosmologies into which the concept of witch­
craft does not fit at all, because they represent everything that 
happens as being fundamentally right, proper, or natural. Some 
religions, for instance, teach a Job-like submission to a divine will 
which brings about everything and is always just. With similar 
effect, rationalism teaches that everything may be interpreted as 
the outcome of natural causes. In neither of these idea systems, if 
consistently .held, is there any room for the witchcraft idea. 
Witches can only have place in a cosmology that admits to the 
possibility of things going wrong, that is, departing from the 
natural and the moral order. We ourselves, in spite of Christianity 
and Rationalism, appear to admit this possibility up to a point, 
as when we speak of “uncanny” luck, meaning contrary to natural 
order or of “unfair” luck, meaning contrary to moral order.
I have been discussing how the witchcraft belief can serve to 
protect the picture of the moral universe, but as we know it can 
also protect many other ideas and beliefs. If you have cultivated 
your fields in the usual way, you may blame a witch for the failure 
of your crop, and so be saved from the thought that accepted 
farming techniques might be at fault. If your illness does not 
respond to treatment, you may blame a witch, and so be saved 
from doubting the worth of medical knowledge and practice. The 
witch system can save other belief systems from being deluged 
with the blame which might otherwise often deservedly fall upon 
them. It gives a channel into which the blame can be turned more 
conveniently. The power of the witch is conceived as something 
that can put a spoke into any wheel; this helps one to assume that, 
but for witchcraft, all the wheels would always be turning 
smoothly.
When we ourselves speak of natural disasters such as drought 
or epidemic, we sometimes call them “Acts of God,” meaning that 
no human being can be held responsible. Primitive peoples who 
attribute these disasters to witches are taking the opposite view; 
they are blaming human beings, and they may even be asserting 
that those human beings caused the disaster just by willing it. I 
think that this notion, bizarre to us at first sight, begins to look 
much more familiar if it is translated into slightly different word­
ing: let us put it that the witch is debited with the moral re­
sponsibility. That is a thing distinct from the immediate physical
(1) H. A. S ta y t ,  T h e B avenda. O .U .P. 1931. p .275 .
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agency. If so-and-so has been wishing for me to suffer, he seems 
to me morally guilty when I do suffer, no matter what the direct 
physical causation may be. It is but a short psychological step 
from attributing moral guilt in this sense to attributing clear 
responsibility; one is only invoking the common principle which 
Freud has called “the omnipotence of thought.”
ill.
So far I have been discussing the witchcraft idea as a cosmo­
logical device, accounting for sufferings that people cannot or will 
not explain otherwise, and providing a pattern of action that the 
sufferer may follow when his misfortune makes him particularly 
uneasy. But the witchcraft idea has of course quite a different 
kind of social importance as well as this. It is a force in social 
relations; it is something that can break up a friendship or a 
marriage or a community; it is a banner under which people hate, 
denounce, and even kill one another. That is the aspect in which 
I now want to discuss it.
When we speak loosely of witches being tried or condemned 
we mean of course that individuals are being tried or condemned 
as witches. The witch does not exist in his own right; it is the 
judgement of society that creates him. Society creates the image 
of the witch, and pins this image down onto particular individuals. 
If we want to find out what individuals are chosen to fill this 
unenviable role, there are two ways to go about the inquiry. The 
first is to try to define a general category of witches. Natives 
define such a category when they say that all individuals with 
pythons in their bellies or with red rims round their eyes are 
witches. We might hope to substitute a more scientific formula­
tion: we might, for instance, be able to show what personality 
types are most commonly associated with the role of witch in a 
given society.
The second way, which has been used to such excellent effect 
by the Kriges and the Wilsons, is to define witches in relation to 
those whom they bewitch. Instead of asking “who are the 
witches?” in vacuo, one asks how witches stand related to their 
supposed victims or their actual accusers. A witchcraft case may 
end in the uprising of a whole community, but it begins as a duel 
between two antagonistic individuals, or even as a one-sided 
mistrust. Our question then is: In a given society, who is most 
likely to accuse whom?
Thanks to the admirable field-work that has now been done 
in many parts of the world, we should be able to answer this 
question with some confidence. Two general rules seem to emerge
i i
from the literature. The first is that witches and their accusers 
are nearly always people close together, belonging to one neigh­
bourhood community or even to one household. This principle is 
expressed in the witchcraft myth by the notion that witches can­
not harm you from far away but only from close by. The second 
rule is that a witchcraft accusation nearly always grows out of 
some personal antipathy or hostile emotion. In the myth this is 
expressed by saying that witches attack where they feel dislike 
or envy.
In the typical case, then, the alleged witch is a neighbour and 
perhaps a kinsman of the accuser who has not been getting on 
well with him or her. I think that most of the apparent exceptions 
to this rule, if analysed, turn out not to relate to genuine witch­
craft but to other phenomena such as sorcery or the evil eye. 
There are a few societies where the rule does not hold, but even 
these exceptions may be of the sort that prove the rule, as Kluck- 
hohn has suggested in his studies of the Navaho111.
It is by now well established that witchcraft accusations may 
be significantly frequent in one or more specific relationships. 
For example, among many African peoples it is specially common 
for a woman to accuse her husband’s other wife of being a witch. 
Among the Mesakin in the Southern Sudan, Nadel found that the 
accusation commonly occurred between a man and his maternal 
uncle12'. As Nadel has suggested, frequencies of this kind should 
be interpreted as pointers to weak spots in the social structure.
We must conclude that witches and their accusers are indivi­
duals who ought to like each other but in fact do not. The two 
elements in the situation—the demand for a positive sentiment 
and the inability to provide it — are equally essential t" the 
picture. Painful tension arises because one individual cannot feel 
towards another as society expects him to feel. By the standards 
of Society one ought to get on well with one’s kinsman or neigh­
bour, one’s co-wife or maternal uncle. If in fact one cannot get on 
well with him or her, the situation may become tense. When such 
a tension becomes insupportable, the only ways to resolve it are 
reconciliation on the one hand or rupture on the other. Marwick 
has shown that among the Cewa accusations of witchcraft serve 12
(1) C. K lu c k h o h n , N avaho  W itch cra ft ; C. K lu c k h o h n  a n d  D . L e ig h to n , T h e N avaho.
(2) S. P . N ade l, “ W i tc h c ra f t  in  F o u r  A fr ic a n  S o c ie tie s ,"  A m erican  A nth rop olog ist, 
V.  54. 1952, p .  24 ff.
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the purpose of rupturing or blasting away relationships that have 
become insupportable(1 ).
When someone starts to argue that someone else is bewitching 
him, this notion may serve to bring to a head the tensions and 
strains of their relationship. It gives a pretext for quarrelling. 
There is no law under which you can denounce a person for being 
personally distasteful to you, but you can denounce him on 
grounds of witchcraft. The witch idea then is a device that 
enables people to dress up their animosities in an actionable guise 
—in the guise of an offence committed against themselves.
Although the condemnation of witches may seem arbitrary in 
a deeper sense, it is nevertheless carried out in due legal form. 
The witch’s guilt is not taken on trust but is determined by some 
supposedly objective standard. We know of many magico-religious 
tests for guilt, such as ordeals, oracles, or diagnosis by magical 
specialists, and of judicial forms, hearings by a court or a body of 
elders. We know that even when a supposed witch is set upon 
by an angry mob and beaten or stoned to death, as used to happen 
in many African tribes, this, is a judicial execution and not an 
uncontrolled lynching. The crowd is the public executioner in a 
non-centralised society: it is not the judge as well.
It has been observed, again by Marwick, that people accuse 
one another of witchcraft when they are prohibited from express­
ing their aggression in other ways such as physical brawling or 
going to law(2) . From my experience among the Gusii, I would 
qualify this by adding that people who have both possibilities 
may still prefer to accuse each other of witchcraft, rather than to 
pick a legal quarrel, because the witchcraft case has a different 
objective. Legal cases among primitive people are usually meant 
to smooth out relationships by patching up quarrels over specific 
issues. However, among the Gusii and perhaps in most other 
societies the parties to a witchcraft case probably do not want to 
be reconciled. What they want is an excuse for rupture. In a 
witchcraft case the thing at stake is not a specific legal issue but 
the whole tone of the relationship.
It is an extremely important question what kinds of sanction 
are used against a witch: when will the suspect be only pursued 
as a private enemy by his self-styled victim, and when will he be 
hounded down as a public enemy by community or state? For this 
largely determines the degree of danger to life and liberty.
(1) M. J .  M arw ick , “T h e  S o c ia l C o n te x t o f C ew a W itc h  B e lie fs ,”  A frica , v. 22, 1952,
p . 126.
(2) Loc. C it. p. 129.
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Let us consider how the matter is handled by the Gusii. Among 
the Gusii, for reasons I shall mention later, there was and still is 
a great reluctance to publicise witch cases. The first recourse is 
to private magic. If this does not give satisfaction, the easiest and 
best way to resolve the tension is to break off relations altogether. 
For where there is no active relationship there can be no active 
danger, either of being bewitched or of being suspected. If a man 
suspects his wife, then he will divorce her; if he suspects his 
sweetheart he will stop courting her; if he suspects his neighbour 
he may leave the neighbourhood. By these and similar personal 
adjustments, rupture is achieved without calling in public sanc­
tions or even trying to enlist public opinion; in fact, secrecy is 
usually a great object. But there remains an alternative way of 
achieving rupture, and this is by an open legal challenge, which 
constitutes a direct appeal to public opinion. If the challenge is 
successful, the witch is liable to be pursued with the whole weight 
of public sanctions, ending in his death or banishment; at best 
he has become a “known witch,” a person ready to be blamed 
and hounded down in any future private or public calamity. If 
the challenge is not successful, the challenge itself has at any rate 
dramatically registered the quarrel as open and bitter, since 
witchcraft is one of the most serious accusations a Gusii can make 
against another.
Modern administrations and governments in Africa have tried 
to lessen the social perils of the witchcraft belief by refusing to 
recognise witchcraft as a criminal offence. In that case it is not 
permitted to try people for witchcraft in the public courts nor to 
use criminal sanctions against supposed witches. Witchcraft 
cases are therefore kept down to the private level. They are duels 
between A and B, not public issues between A and the community.
This solution has undoubtedly removed the most dramatic 
dangers to life and liberty. But it brings other problems in its 
train. The public condemnation and execution of a witch, how­
ever repugnant it was, may be considered to have served a useful 
function from one point of view. It was cathartic; it purged the 
whole community of certain anxieties for the time-being. They 
had found the public enemy who made things go wrong for all 
of them; they had destroyed him; they could all breathe more 
freely. But now that the anxieties cannot be purged by a few 
great public witch-hunts, they have to find outlet in countless 
little private hunts. Every sufferer has to find his own witch. It 
is less dangerous to be thought a witch, but there is much more 
likelihood of being thought one.
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Since the accusation of witchcraft can be such a dangerous 
weapon, we have to enquire what safeguards there are against its 
being used too freely. We all feel that a society that gives exces­
sive prominence to witchcraft must be a sick society, rather as a 
witch-ridden personality is a sick personality. This is confirmed 
by anthropological studies which in several cases have shown an 
increase of witchcraft phenomena in communities undergoing 
social breakdown. The native peoples of South Africa during the 
difficult phase of urbanisation provide several cases in point.
In a normally stable society the witchcraft system is effectively 
controlled. It admittedly provides a vent for hatreds and anxieties 
that society cannot repress, but this remains after all a controlled 
outlet: the frequency or severity of convictions is somehow kept 
within bounds. It should be anthropologically valuable to com­
pare the ways in which different societies achieve this control. 
To-night, however, I shall only single out one aspect. In many 
societies, including the Gusii, the weapon of witchcraft accusation 
is given a double edge. There is good reason to think twice before 
you denounce your enemy as a witch, for the denunciation may 
very well recoil upon your own head.
The literature shows how common it is for witchcraft cases to 
be ambiguous in this sense. Prima facie the signs that point to 
a person’s being a victim of witchcraft can equally well point to 
his being a witch himself. Let me give a few examples: I take 
them from the Gusii, but they would fit many other peoples too. 
If you have been out alone in the night you could well have been 
attacked by the witches whom you saw prowling in the dark. But 
to the person you met you looked just like a prowling witch 
yourself. If you have a peculiar illness, it may mean that you are 
being bewitched; but it may mean that someone whom you 
yourself have bewitched is using revenge magic against you. If 
you have become unusually prosperous, the witches will probably 
be attacking you, because they always go for people whose good 
fortune they envy. On the other hand, the kind of person who 
grows prosperous while all around him are poor is very likely 
to be a witch himself. If you marry into a witch family, or other­
wise consort with known witches, who is more likely than you 
to become their next victim? On the other hand, why did you 
ever take up with such people if you were not yourself a witch? 
If you have left your home and gone to settle in a far-away place, 
you may say that you fled from witches who threatened you at 
the old home. But other people may say that you fled as a witch 
fearing detection.
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It may sound paradoxical to say that witches and their victims 
look much the same in the public eye, but it makes good sense if 
we remember that the matter really at stake is a sensation of 
distrust or hatred. There is not much essential difference between 
the statement “I hate X,” and the statement “X hates me.” Even 
if the hatred is not actually mutual, the one who feels it will 
probably project it onto the other party. As Lienhardt puts it, a 
man who easily hates is also one who easily believes himself to 
be hated(1).
At any rate, among the Gusii, as among many other peoples, 
it is almost as dangerous to accuse a witch, or to defend yourself 
against a witch, as it is to be a witch. The three kinds of activity 
merge into one another. The act of defending oneself involves a 
dangerous kind of black magic called Mosira, so deadly that its 
use against anyone, except a witch, is considered anti-social. 
Mosira, like witchcraft itself, produces death or sickness. In view 
of this, the facts in a given case can always be interpreted in 
opposite ways. Each party can say that his own sufferings are due 
to his enemy’s witchcraft and that his enemy’s sufferings are due 
to his own Mosira. A’s interpretation of the evidence will thus 
exactly contradict B’s. Besides, if a person uses Mosira and has 
great success with it, people will suspect that he is probably a 
witch too. They will feel that if he can defeat other witches so 
triumphantly he must also have been well versed in their tricks 
himself.
To accuse a witch in public is dangerous, if only because the 
ordeal has to be taken by both parties; the ordeal can turn against 
the accuser and show that he himself was really the witch. But 
even if things do not get to this stage, it must be remembered 
that slandering a person by wantonly calling him a witch is in 
itself a very grave offence. The Gusii say that this kind of back­
biting is just as bad as witchcraft itself; and in this they are quite 
logical, since both witchcraft and back-biting contain the same 
element of turning disloyal to one’s own neighbour. Nowadays, 
though the government tribunals refuse to try witchcraft cases 
as such, they are often called upon to try cases of back-biting in 
this technical sense.
IV.
I want to end by stating some general conclusions about the 
reality underlying the notion of witchcraft.
f l )  G . L ie n h a rd t ,  "S om e N o tio n s  o f W i tc h c ra f t  a m o n g  th e  D in k a ,” A frica , v. 21, 1951, 
p . 317.
16
The figure of the witch, clearly enough, embodies those char­
acteristics that society specially disapproves. The values of the 
witch directly negate the values of society. Typical witchcraft 
myths attribute to witches many kinds of vices including those 
that are considered unnatural or specially horrible. Lienhardt 
has written of the Dinka witch as one who “embodies those 
appetites and passions in every man which if ungoverned would 
destroy any moral law”(1). That is well said; and it reminds us 
that the witchcraft myth has after all a certain educative or 
normative function. In the words of Kluckhohn, “Witchcraft lore 
affirms solidarity by dramatically defining what is bad”(2).
The witch myth then recognises an opposition of moral values; 
an opposition of good and bad, right and wrong, proper and im­
proper, sinful and righteous. The witch is always on the wrong 
side of the moral line, he is a figure of sin incarnate. However, 
I think that another or a more particular kind of opposition is also 
vitally involved. I mean the opposition between “us” and “them,” 
between in-group and out-group, between allies and foes. The 
witch is the figure of a person who has turned traitor to his own 
group. He has secretly taken the wrong side in the basic social 
opposition between “us” and “them.” This is what makes him a 
criminal and not only a sinner.
As we have seen, the witch is conceived as a person within 
one’s own local community, and often even within one’s own 
household. All human societies require a basic loyalty between 
members of the small co-operative and defensive group. The local 
community, the family, the household, all in one way or another 
make this demand of loyalty as a categorical imperative. Persons 
who stand in these intimate relations must on the whole work 
together, not against one another, if the group is to survive as a 
group. In one word they have to pursue common or joint interests. 
Injury to one should be felt as injury to all. But the witch is 
conceived as a person who withholds this elementary loyalty and 
secretly pursues opposed interests. He wants to spoil what his 
fellows most want to preserve: their life, health, strength, and 
fertility; their children and their livelihood. He wants to blast 
their crops and dry up the milk of their cattle. These fundamental 
interests of life, strength and subsistence are legitimately attacked 
by enemies in open warfare, but the witch is not fighting open 
war; he does not come from outside like a raider; he dwells within 
the group and destroys by stealth. The witch is the hidden enemy 
within the gate. He eats away like the maggot in the apple. *2
(J )  Loc. c it. p . 311.
(2) C. K lu c k h o h n  a n d  D. L e ig h to n . T h e  N a v a h o . p . 179.
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If we look upon the witch figure in this light as the arch traitor, 
the type of the fifth column, I think that several facts about witch 
beliefs are more readily understood; the main features all seem 
to fit readily into this pattern.
In the light of this principle we understand why the witch is 
regarded as not altogether human, why witchcraft is a so-called 
unnatural offence. The person who denies those basic loyalties 
to family and community outrages the sentiments, on which all 
social life must rest. The witch has denied the social nature of 
man; that is as much as to deny human nature itself. No wonder 
if the myth represents witches as eating their own children or 
consorting with hyenas and corpses. Anyone who can turn secret 
traitor to his nearest fellows is surely capable of all other un­
natural sentiments too.
In this sense witchcraft is exactly parallel to incest. As 
Radcliffe-Brown has pointed out'(1), the great social danger of 
incest is that it threatens to overthrow the sentiments on which 
the family depends for its organised existence. It is entirely 
logical, on this showing, that witchcraft and incest both rank as 
unnatural offences, and that often both are attributed to the same 
individuals.
Further, we understand why witchcraft is always secret, and 
always associated with the night. The witch is essentially a 
hidden enemy but an apparent friend. If he did not appear to be 
one of ourselves he would not be betraying our trust. In the day 
he looks like anyone else: only at night does he reveal his secret 
inclinations. As the Lovedu say: “You eat with him, yet it is he 
who eats you”,(2).
Above all, we understand why witchcraft is treated as a 
criminal offence, even in those primitive societies where criminal 
sanctions otherwise hardly exist. By his treason the witch has 
forfeited his rights as a member of the in-group; he has outlawed 
himself; he has pursued the interests of an enemy; then let him 
be treated like an enemy, killed or put to flight.
We know that some peoples punish repeated petty theft within 
the community in the same manner as witchcraft—in fact they 
make these the only two offences punishable by death. The 
element of disloyalty provides the link between these two 
offences, which to the western minds seem so different. The petty 
thief who steals from his own neighbours is like the witch secretly 
attacking the interests of his own group. 12
(1) A fr ic a n  S y s te m s  o f K in s h ip  a n d  M a rr ia g e , ed . by A. R . R ad c liffe -B ro w n  a n d  D.
F o rd e , I n tro d u c tio n ,  p. 70 ff.
(2) J .  D. a n d  E. J .  K rig e , T h e  R ea lm  of a  R a in  Q ueen , p . 263.
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I think that the same principle helps to some extent to explain 
how society chooses the individuals who fill the role of witches. 
The disloyal person will be sought among those who have failed 
to give public demonstrations of their loyalty. Accordingly the 
witch is the woman who fails to give tokens of goodwill to her 
neighbours: she is reserved, uncommunicative or stingy; a with- 
holder of gifts, or of hospitality, yet greedy for the good things 
that other people have.
Possibly we might also use the concept of a withheld loyalty 
to help to explain why witches are so often women. It would 
seem appropriate enough in those patrilineal societies where the 
new wife is brought in to join the household and community as a 
person from an outside group. There is a demand for the woman 
to merge interests and loyalties with those of her marital home, 
but she still keeps in her heart some private personal loyalties to 
her home of origin. She is thus the person who most readily fits 
into the image of an enemy within the gate.
What I have been saying relates to the witches of primitive 
society, but I think it applies equally well to certain phenomena 
of the civilised world. For we too are often found in situations 
where our basic values and basic loyalties seem threatened; and 
we too are apt to seek out the enemies within our gates.
In civilised societies other demands for over-riding loyalties 
have been added to those of the family and community. We are 
divided not only into groups but also into parties. We stand or 
fall by our ideologies, in a manner quite foreign to the primitive 
society with its general ideological uniformity. Civilisation brings 
with it an opposition of sects; of orthodoxies and heresies; of rival 
religions and political “isms.” Civilisation still has its witches, but 
it is more apt to call them traitors to a cause, or an idea, or a way 
of life. It was consistent that for so many centuries in Christian 
Europe the witch was identified with the heretic or the devil 
worshipper, and persecuted as such by the Church. Given the idea 
of basic opposition between Christ and the devil, the witch would 
be conceived as one who had secretly left Christ and gone over to 
the devil. In our day we also have a feeling of fundamental cleav­
age, between the Communist and the Non-Communist world. 
When people in one of these camps start looking into corners and 
under beds to find hidden enemies who secretly sympathise with 
the other camp, we get what is very properly called a witch hunt. 
The classic examples of witch hunting in modern society are the 
purges of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia and other com­
munist countries. The witch figure in the communist purge is a 
person who has turned traitor in this basic opposition, by harbour­
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ing secret bourgeois sympathies or secret leanings towards capital­
ism. He is identified and by “confessing” at his trial he takes the 
blame for things he could not possibly have caused. He is purged, 
and the group has reaffirmed its solidarity.
It is equally proper to call McCarthyism a witch hunt, as 
distinct from a simple political persecution. It is a witch hunt 
because it too goes out and meets its selected victims much more 
than half way. It takes people who have not yet committed any 
crime, and tries by all means to fit them into the image of traitors 
to a cause, the American way of life.
Witch hunting, then, goes together with a feeling that basic 
sentiments, values and interests are being endangered. A society 
in order to feel secure must feel that not only its material interests 
but also its way of life, its fundamental values, are safe. Witch- 
hunting may increase whenever either of these elements seems 
gravely threatened. Among primitive peoples, as we have seen, 
an increase in witch-hunting is apt to occur both when natural 
disasters threaten their material interests, and when culture con­
tact threatens their way of life. If witch-hunting is a reaction to 
a society’s feeling of insecurity, it seems unlikely to disappear 
from the civilised world at present, unless we can remove the 
radical feeling of insecurity which haunts our nations today.
